

MILLIKANFEST

HOSTED BY THE EXPRESSION, COMMUNICATION, AND ORIGINS OF MEANING RESEARCH GROUP AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

OCTOBER 5-6 | UCONN FOUNDATION BOARDROOM | STORRS, CT

UCONN

PHILOSOPHY

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 5

9:00 - 9:30	Breakfast/Coffee
9:30 - 10:00	Opening Remarks Welcome: Lewis Gordon, Introduction: Don Baxter
10:00 - 11:15	François Recanati (Collège de France) Thinking through Language
11:15 - 11:30	Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:10	Dorit Bar-On (UConn) Psychologically Mediated Communication: A Millikan-Inspired View
12:10 - 12:20	Break
12:20 - 12:50	Elmar Unnsteinsson (University College Dublin & University of Iceland) Millikan on the Biological Categories of Belief and Desire
12:50 - 2:00	Lunch
2:00 - 3:15	Rosa Cao (Stanford) Teleosemantics without Biology?
3:15 - 3:30	Coffee Break
3:30 - 4:00	Fabian Hundertmark (Bielefeld) Proper Functions as Selected Dispositions
4:00 - 4:40	David Papineau (King's College London) Representation as a Natural Kind
4:40 - 4:50	Break
4:50 - 6:10	The Next Generation Nimra Asif (UConn): The Value of Pushmi-pullyu Representations for Understanding Animal Minds Drew Johnson (Oslo): Attention, Agency, and Representation Karl Bergman (Uppsala): Meaning, Undermined Alison Springle (Oklahoma): Food for (Squirrel) Thought: 'Acorns' & The Metaphysics of Millikan's Affordance Perception
6:15 - 6:45	Comments by Ruth
6:45 - 8:45	Reception for All

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6

9:00 - 9:30	Breakfast/Coffee
9:30 - 10:45	Robyn Carston (University College London) Ostensive Communication and Language: Millikan and the Linguists
10:45 - 11:00	Coffee Break
11:00 - 11:40	Peter Schulte (Zurich) A Twice-Told Tale: Millikan's Biosemantics and the Role of the Consumer
11:40 - 11:50	Break
11:50 - 12:20	Jakob Roloff, Simon Krein, Oliver Schütze (Justus Liebig University Giessen) Natural Information Depends on Interpretive Process
12:20 - 1:00	Andrew Melnyk (Missouri) Millikan's Exorcism of Creatures of Darkness
1:00 - 2:10	Lunch
2:10 - 2:40	Megan Stotts (McMaster) Reproduction and Social Institutions
2:40 - 2:50	Coffee Break
2:50 - 4:05	Josh Armstrong (UCLA) On the Proper Function of Meaning Intentions
4:05 - 4:10	Break
4:10 - 5:30	Panel Discussion (led by Dan Dennett)
5:30 - 6:15	Closing Comments by Ruth
7:30	Speakers' Dinner (Graduate Hotel)

This conference will be held in the University of Connecticut Foundation Building (2390 Alumni Drive). Guest parking is available in either the North (3152 Hillside Road) or South (2366 Jim Calhoun Way) Parking Garage. Rates are \$2 per hour for the first three hours, and \$1.50 thereafter to a cap of \$30 for the day. Payment must be made upon entry for the expected duration of the visit. Payment is via online app (paybyphone or flowbird) or kiosk.



Directions from North Parking Garage
goo.gl/maps/DJMVW35FH77NBT757



Directions from South Parking Garage
goo.gl/maps/FBRDu2fdEsYBe4VF6

François Recanati

Collège de France

THINKING THROUGH LANGUAGE

Thanks to the mechanism of deference, language “broadens the horizons of thought,” as David Kaplan puts it. This gives rise to verbal thought, a specific form of thought that is parasitic on language. How is this phenomenon to be understood? I will discuss the views of three philosophers: John Locke, David Kaplan, and Ruth Millikan. In contrast to Locke, both Kaplan and Millikan take verbal thought to be a genuine form of thought. Kaplan thinks we can’t account for it without giving up a conception of semantics, which he calls “subjectivism” and which Locke explicitly endorsed. That, I will argue, is a mistake: subjectivism is not the issue. Following Millikan, we can account for verbal thought while holding that concepts are psychological entities, privy to the mental life of the subject who deploys them.

Dorit Bar-On

UConn

PSYCHOLOGICALLY MEDIATED COMMUNICATION: A MILLIKAN-INSPIRED VIEW

In this paper, I wish to argue that Millikan’s work can be mined for valuable insights concerning potential continuities between human and nonhuman forms of communication. Identifying these continuities does not rely on treating linguistic communication as itself a form of coded communication of the sort found among existing nonhuman animals (as per Origgi & Sperber’s 2000 criticism of Millikan). Instead, it requires recognizing the possibility of a form of communication that is intermediate between purely coded communication, on the one hand, and paradigmatically Gricean, “ostensive-inferential” communication, which essentially depends on communicators’ capacity for recursive mindreading. This is what I describe as psychologically mediated communication, which I offer to construe in Millikanian biosemantic terms. In psychologically mediated communication, communicators deploy a capacity to recognize — without yet conceptualizing — and attend to each other’s states of mind. (This is a capacity for “mind-minding,” which falls short of the capacity for full-blown mindreading.) What enables such recognition, I propose, is the communicators’ routine engagement in expressive behaviors — behaviors whose proper function is directly to show communicators’ states of mind to each other.

Elmar Unnsteinsson

University College Dublin & University of Iceland

MILLIKAN ON THE BIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES OF BELIEF AND DESIRE

Ruth Millikan has argued that the representational content of desire can be reduced and naturalized by saying, roughly, that the biological function of a desire is its own satisfaction. Some theorists have worried that this is circular, because the desire’s function then seems to presuppose a prior account of representational content. I argue that Millikan’s view can be developed in a way that fully takes care of the worry. Basically, desires are dumb, and the only contents they have as such is that they aim at their own termination. However, the organism’s representational system will assign more sophisticated contents to individual dumb desires. Thus we arrive at smart desire-states — dumb desires combined with representations — which are easily explained by broadly biological considerations. Representations increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the organism’s attempts to achieve desire-satisfaction, especially relative to the vast network of dumb desires it carries over extended periods. The new account of desire should be welcomed by the teleosemanticist — and other naturalists — as it overcomes worries about circularity and helps to explain the biological function of mental representation.

Rosa Cao

Stanford

TELEOSEMANTICS WITHOUT BIOLOGY?

Neural network models have come to play a significant role in neuroscience, as well as, more recently, in our broader cultural life. These models produce increasingly sophisticated behaviors that call out for explanation: from classifying novel images to manipulating language in ways that appear meaningful. Are these systems promising models of how we think and talk? In humans we take sophisticated behavioral capacities to require internal representations — but on what basis can we assess whether neural network models have internal representations at all? Millikan’s teleosemantic framework provides a natural starting point, but what is the most productive way to apply it to non-living systems that do not form reproductive lineages? I outline one possibility, by introducing a synchronic notion of function which highlights similarities between evolution by natural selection and the processes by which these artificial systems are produced. The goal is to find a unified approach to ascribing representational content in humans, animals and machines, while preserving the spirit of the teleosemantic approach.

Fabian Hundertmark

Bielefeld

PROPER FUNCTIONS AS SELECTED DISPOSITIONS

A theory of proper functions must account for dysfunctions and their graduality, as well as productive functions — proper functions to engage in novel activities in response to novel stimuli. In this paper, I argue that theories that construe proper functions as current dispositions of a trait (e.g., Cummins 1975, Mossio and Saborido 2016), as well as theories that view proper functions as selected effects or activities (e.g., Millikan 1984, Neander 1991, and Garson 2019), fail to satisfy these conditions. By contrast, I show that theories that construe proper functions as selected dispositions (e.g., Godfrey-Smith 1994, Neander 2017, Hundertmark 2021) can overcome these shortcomings.

David Papineau

King's College London

REPRESENTATION AS A NATURAL KIND

Ruth Millikan has deepened our understanding of both representation and natural kinds. In this talk I shall combine her insights on these two topics to explain why histories of natural selection are essential to representation.

THE NEXT GENERATION

Nimra Asif

UConn

THE VALUE OF PUSHMI-PULLYU REPRESENTATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING ANIMAL MINDS

Pushmi-pullyu representations (PPRs) are non-conjunctive representations that have a descriptive and directive function at the same time; they at once give information about the world and instruct the organism what to do (Millikan, 1995). The hallmark of PPRs is the existence of unmediated and direct connection between perception and action, insofar as the descriptive information in the PPR is immediately linked to action or something specific that should be done without the need to make any inferences. Recently, however, researchers have questioned the theoretical cogency and usefulness of PPRs (Artiga, 2014; Bauer, 2020). I defend the cogency of PPRs as a distinctive class of representations with special features and offer an argument for the explanatory utility of PPRs. I argue that the special character of PPRs renders them generally useful for the purpose of explaining the behavior of non-human animals whether they are simple or complex, such as their responses to changes in the environment, their communicative skills, and their social cognitive abilities. I explain how PPRs can give us a

way of articulating a basic form of mindreading that non-human animals, human infants, and even human adults under cognitive load could possibly use. Lastly, I argue that PPRs can play an important role in explaining certain aspects of human representational systems especially human behaviors that are automatic, instinctive, and action guiding.

THE NEXT GENERATION

Drew Johnson

Oslo

ATTENTION, AGENCY, AND REPRESENTATION

In the final chapters of *Varieties of Meaning*, Ruth Millikan takes up the question: “How and why did perception-action cycles, which seem fully to characterize the cognitive character of the simplest animals, slowly give way to or become supplemented with more articulate and differentiated representations such as human beliefs ... and human desires ...?” (p. 157). In Millikan’s framework, this translates roughly to the question of how the two faces (descriptive and directive) of inner Pushmi-Pullyu Representations (PPRs) could have come to be pulled apart. In this paper, I argue that recent work on attention can be fruitfully applied to this question.

Drawing on the work of Alan Allport (1987) and Odmar Neumann (1987), Wayne Wu (2014) and Sebastian Watzl (2017) (among others) have proposed that attention has a foundational role in agency. Attention is the faculty which enables a creature to “avoid the behavioral chaos that would result from an attempt to simultaneously perform all possible actions for which sufficient causes exist” (Neumann 1987, p. 374). In Watzl’s account, attention integrates sensory inputs with the individual’s needs, enabling flexible action while avoiding behavioral chaos (2017, p. 108).

The set of significant transformations that a particular PPR can undergo defines a “behavior space” for an individual in a situation. As the range of possible transformations increases, I argue, the need for attention will also increase. At the limit case, where there is no direct mapping from representations of the environment onto subsequent forms of behavior, it becomes possible to attend to cold, dead facts, independently of how they might be used. A prediction of this proposal is that mind-wandering, daydreaming, and other “off-task” attentional patterns will be found only in complex cognitive systems, and may be uniquely human.

THURSDAY, OCT. 5

THE NEXT GENERATION

Karl Bergman

Uppsala

MEANING, UNDERMINED

In the “coda on Swampman” of Millikan’s 2010 essay “On knowing the meaning,” Millikan once again tangles with that fearsome foe of teleosemantics, the atom-for-atom replica of Donald Davidson created by chance in a steamy swamp. We might expect Millikan to simply deny, as she has elsewhere, that Swampman has beliefs and other intentional attitudes, and to justify her denial, in the face of would-be intuitions, by rejecting that “last myth of the given”, meaning rationalism. She does do all that, but then she makes a qualification:

“Swampman is not a candidate for having beliefs. Or, more accurately, in the world of Swampman the ordinary meaning of ‘belief has been undermined; the word is left hanging.” (“On knowing the meaning”, p. 78)

It is this “more accurate” characterization of the Swampman case I want to speak about. It would have been simple enough to just deny that Swampman’s inner states belong to the kind denoted by “belief.” That, though perhaps counterintuitive, would have kept us safely within the confines of mainstream philosophical assumptions. Words have referents or intensions, and whether or not we can get hold of them by the method of cases and intuitions, once we have them, we can bring them with us into arbitrary counterfactual scenarios and speak unproblematically about what our words do and do not apply to in those scenarios. The suggestion that meaning is ‘undermined’ in these scenarios suggest a much more radical break with conventional wisdom. In this talk, I want to try to articulate how this break could be understood and how it could be justified.

THE NEXT GENERATION

Alison Springle

Oklahoma

FOOD FOR (SQUIRREL) THOUGHT: ‘ACORNS’ & THE METAPHYSICS OF MILLIKAN’S AFFORDANCE PERCEPTION

Philosophers typically associate the psychologist JJ Gibson with two claims: (1) that perception does not consist in the brain constructing a representation out of informationally impoverished proximal stimulation, and (2) that perception instead consists in the direct pick-up of affordances — roughly, opportunities for action, such as eating, hiding-under/behind, walking-over, etc. In Gibson’s view, exploratory (“epistemic”) perceptual activity “obtains” invariants in physical structure, and to perceive invariants is to perceive what they afford. In light of (1), Gibson is standardly treated as an anti-representationalist. Yet, the notions Gibson employs in characterizing

affordances could suggest a different picture. Indeed, Gibson describes affordances in terms of: (a) the “information” (for mistaken perceptions, “misinformation”) that’s “specified” in perception, (b) the “meaning” (or “value”) of a perception, and (c) a “direct” as opposed to “indirect” form of knowledge, where paradigmatic representations (e.g., pictures) extend perceptual knowledge in an “indirect” form. Moreover, there are reasons to hold onto perceptual representations even if we accept (1). Millikan’s representationalist account of affordance perception in terms of “pushmi-pullyu representations” (“PPRs”) and “Affording Unicepts” (2017) deserves praise for both its ingenuity and keen sensitivity to the nuances of Gibson’s view. These qualities make Millikan’s view radical but also powerful from the point of view of defending representationalism about perception and cognition more generally. Indeed, using examples like the grey squirrel that engages in “a sort of trial and error in perception” to figure out how to access her birdfeeder, Millikan illustrates the potential power of PPRs to explain capacities like instrumental reasoning in nonhuman animals. But of course, every ingenious and radical theory is bound to suffer a few gaps and tensions. In this talk, I suggest a way of addressing some of these gaps and tensions with the help of Gibson’s largely neglected metaphysics. A bit of historical analysis suggests that actions and activities are at the center of Gibson’s metaphysics which, in an Aristotelian spirit, prioritizes functional unities and hierarchical teleological processes. Elsewhere I have argued that realism about mental representations can be preserved in such a metaphysics, if representations are understood as the “acorns” of actions. Here I show how Millikan’s PPRs and Affording Unicepts can be adapted to this view. However, doing so generates a different set of tensions, and addressing these tensions would cost Millikan certain theoretical commitments. The question, then, is whether the benefit is worth the cost. Though I think it is, I mostly leave this question as food for thought.

FRIDAY, OCT. 6

Robyn Carston

University College London

OSTENSIVE COMMUNICATION AND LANGUAGE: MILLIKAN AND THE LINGUISTS

The aim of this talk is to discuss ways in which Ruth Millikan’s distinctive ideas about language function and communication can (and cannot) be reconciled with apparently quite different approaches to these topics in linguistics: (a) the relevance-theoretic account of ostensive-inferential communication, and (b) the generative linguistics account of I-language. Ostensive communication, often characterized as involving a speaker intentionally making mutually manifest her intention to inform a hearer of something, is usually coupled with pragmatic-inferential processes on the part of the hearer that are claimed to require the ability to attribute beliefs

and intentions. Millikan maintains, on the contrary, that in the “Normal” case, no such “mind-reading” is required and comprehension is no more (nor less) inferential than direct perception (Millikan 1984, 2004, 2017). Talk of what the speaker intends is to be “understood transparently rather than opaquely” (Millikan 2005: 219). Drawing on work by Gómez (1996, 2005) and Sperber (2018, 2019) on kinds of attention manipulation, I suggest a decoupling of ostensive communication and mindreading comprehension, which is much closer to the Millikanian view. An act of ostension may overtly and directly draw attention to some content (e.g. that it is raining) rather than to the speaker’s intention to communicate that content, and the hearer may infer the intended content without attributing mental states to the speaker. The ostensive signaling system par excellence is human language. I will consider the extent to which Millikan’s “biological model” of language and the Lenneberg/Chomsky-inspired “biolinguistic program” in generative linguistics (e.g. Hauser et al. 2002; Di Sciullo & Boeckx 2011) may be integrated in a comprehensive account of language.

Peter Schulte

University College London

A TWICE-TOLD TALE: MILLIKAN’S BIOSEMANTICS AND THE ROLE OF THE CONSUMER

Millikan’s biosemantics is commonly characterized as a “consumer theory” of representational content (Jacob 2000; Shea 2007; Neander 2012). Proponents of this characterization interpret Millikan as privileging representations consumers over representation producers in her account of content determination. However, Millikan herself rejects this interpretation and claims to give producers and consumers equal weight in her theory (see, e.g., Millikan 2023). In this talk, I will try to resolve this puzzling issue. I will argue that there are actually two Millikanian theories of content, a consumer theory that is suggested by explicit formulations in her earlier work (Millikan 1984, 1989) and a significantly different, “hybrid” theory that is implicitly presupposed in much of her later work (Millikan 1993, 2004, 2017). This result is not only of exegetical value, but also of great systematic interest, since both theories turn out to be interesting proposals in their own right.

Jakob Roloff, Simon Krein, Oliver Schütze

Justus Liebig
University Giessen

NATURAL INFORMATION DEPENDS ON INTERPRETIVE PROCESS

In *Knowledge and the Flow of Information* (1981), Dretske described natural information as “an objective commodity, something whose generation, transmission, and reception do not require or in any way presuppose interpretive processes” (p. vii). More recently, a much simpler “correlational theory” of natural information has been more generally accepted which shares the same stringent assumption. According to the correlational theory, a state of affairs *a* is a natural sign of another state of affairs *b* if the occurrence of *a* raises the probability of the occurrence of *b* (Lloyd 1989, Price 2001, Shea 2007).

In *Beyond Concepts* (2017, Ch. 11), Millikan rejects this stringent assumption. She points out that the “reference class problem” from probability theory is a fundamental challenge to correlational accounts for they must face the difficulty of nonarbitrarily determining the relevant reference classes for the correlations invoked (144-8). Millikan proposes an account according to which the kind of natural information used in cognition exists only relative to the perceptual abilities and space- time paths of interpreting organisms or species. However, Millikan’s proposal retains the assumption that the existence of natural information is independent of any actual interpretive processes.

We claim that even this is an error. Taking her ideas a step further, we will argue for a description of natural information that requires its uptake in actual interpretive processes. To explain how organisms can use natural information, only actually interpreted instances are needed. The result is thus a radicalized version of Millikan’s account of natural information.

Andrew Melnyk

Missouri

MILLIKAN’S EXORCISM OF CREATURES OF DARKNESS

Ruth Millikan provides an account of what it is for both true and false indicative sentences to have the intentional content that they have; but she aims to do so without appealing to merely possible states of affairs or (I think) to propositions understood as more than mere *façons de parler*. I will expound and elaborate on her account, along the way considering some objections to it.

Megan Stotts

McMaster

REPRODUCTION AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

When writing about social institutions, philosophers tend to emphasize the deep and distinctive ways in which their existence and nature are “up to us.” And this is certainly true. Trees and rocks could exist with the same basic nature in the absence of human activity; governments and religious organizations could not. But the extent to which social institutions are “up to us” has been overemphasized. I’ll start with some cases in which the existence and nature of social institutions is less “up to us” than we might expect. This motivates thinking of social institutions as arising not from our thoughts, but just from behavior that clusters into roles, where all of the behavior works together to promote some result(s). However, I’ll argue that this understanding of social institutions cannot differentiate them from certain non-institutional social phenomena, and that Ruth Millikan’s notion of reproduction can help us differentiate them properly. I’ll suggest, though, that Millikan’s definition of reproduction is overly demanding and needs to be amended. Then I’ll develop a revised definition: activity Y is a copy (or reproduction) of activity X if and only if one or more features of X caused the same feature(s) in Y, where the mechanism of causation operates within the scope of the copying individual’s own life. This allows us to differentiate social institutions from other social phenomena, while also capturing the right way in which institutions are “up to us”: they are entirely dependent on our behavior.

Josh Armstrong

UCLA

ON THE PROPER FUNCTION OF MEANING INTENTIONS

Since the influential discussions of H.P. Grice, it has widely been held that the ability to successfully communicate with a language essentially depends on the production and recognition of complex meaning intentions. In this talk, I will explore the proper function of meaning intention in human systems of communication and social action. I will argue that while humans can and do successfully communicate with language without the use of meaning intentions, there are strong selective pressures to produce and recognize meaning intentions given the specific ecological and social contexts in which humans normally deploy language. On the account I develop, meaning intentions are real and theoretically important for understanding human lifeways but not the sine qua non of human social interaction that they have often been made out to be.

STORRS CENTER SHOPS AND DINING



Dining

Enjoy tasty cuisines from all around the globe at over two dozen eateries.

[DOWNTOWNSTORRS.ORG/DINE](https://downtownstorrs.org/dine)




Shopping

Explore the shops Storrs Center has to offer!

[DOWNTOWNSTORRS.ORG/SHOP](https://downtownstorrs.org/shop)





UCONN STORRS CAMPUS MAP

Map Legend

ACADEMIC & ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS	
ABL	Agricultural Biotechnology Laboratory... C5
ACS	Art Ceramic Studio... F5
ALUM	Alumni Center... E3
ARJ	Jaime Romero Arjona Building... E6
ARTB	Art Building... F7
ATL	Advanced Technology Laboratory... C5
ATWR	Wilbur O. Atwater Laboratory... D4
AUST	Philip O. Austin Building... D5
BARN	Dairy Barn... B5
BCH	Charles Lewis Beach Hall... D5
BISH	Merlin D. Bishop Center... E7
BOOK	UConn Bookstore... F4
BOUS	Weston A. Bousfield Psychology Building... E5
BPB	Biology/Physics Building... D4
BRON	Arthur B. Brownell Building... D4
BSC	Bio Science Complex... C5
BUD	John J. Budds Building... E6
BUSN	School of Business... E4
CAST	Francis L. Castleman Building... E4
CHIL	South Campus Chiller Plant... F6
CHM	Chemistry Building... D4
CMWH	Commissary Warehouse... D6
CRU	Cattle Resources Unit... A7
CSH	Cordial Storrs House... D6
CUP	Central Utility Plant... D4
DB	UConn Dairy Bar... C5
DC	The Daily Campus... F7
DODD	The Dodd Center for Human Rights... E5
DRMU	Drama-Music Building... F7
E2	Engineering II... D4
ENSO	Environmental Health & Safety Office... B8
ESB	Engineering Science Building... D4
FAC	Fine Arts Complex... F7
FES	Farm and Event Services... B8
FG	Floriculture Greenhouse... C5
FND	University of Connecticut Foundation... E3
FO	Facilities Operations... D2
FSB	Family Studies Building... D6
GN	Gant North Building... D3
GP	Gant Plaza... D3
GS	Gant South Building... D4
GW	Gant West Building... D3
GENT	Charles B. Gentry Building... D4
GUL	Albert Gordon Gully Hall... D6
HALL	William H. Hall Building... E5
HAWL	Willis Nichols Hawley Armory... E5
HBL	Homer Rabbidge Library... E5
HDC	Human Development Center... G6
HHA	Horsebarn Hill Arena... B7
HHSC	Horsebarn Hill Sciences Complex... B8
HJT	Harriet S. Jorgensen Theatre... D4
HSM	J. Robert Donnelly Husky Heritage Sports Museum... E3
HU1	Horse Unit I... B7
HU2	Horse Unit II... B8
IOE	Institute of the Environment... B8
IPB	Innovation Partnership Building... A1
ISS	Center for International Students and Scholars... F5
ITE	Information Technologies Engineering Bldg... E5
JB	Jacobson Barn... A4
JONS	Roy E. Jones Building... B6
JORG	Jorgensen Center for the Performing Arts... D4
JRB	J. Ray Ryan Building... F5
KB	Kinesiology Building... B8
KEL	Frances E. Osborne Kellogg Dairy Center... A5
KLIN	Merle S. Klinck Building... C5
KNS	Benjamin Franklin Koons Hall... D5
LAKE	Lakeside Building... C5
LAND	Landscaping Services... B6
LOR	Arthur L. Lorentzon Stables... B7
LU1	Livestock Unit I... A8
LU2	Livestock Unit II... A7
LVC	Lodewick Visitors Center... D3
MA	Museum Annex... B8
MAA	Main Accumulation Area/Environmental Health and Safety... C1
MAN	Harry Grant Manchester Hall... E6
MB	Mink Barn... A4
MB1	Modular Building #1... B8
MB2	Modular Building #2... B8
MB3	Modular Building #3... B8
MB5	Modular Building #5... B8
MCHU	Lawrence D. McHugh Hall... E4
MONT	Henry Rutven Monteth Building... E6
MP	Motor Pool... C2
MUSB	Music Building... F7
NKT	Nale Katter Theatre... F7
NPRK	North Parking Garage... D3
OAK	Oak Hall... E5
PBB	Pharmacy/Biology Building... D4
PCSB	David C. Phillips Communication Sciences Building... G6
PDFD	University Safety Complex, Police/Fire Depts... D2
PLA	Planetarium... C5
PU1	Poultry Unit... A4
RB	Rosebrooks Barn... A4
RH	Rosebrooks House... A4
RHA	Ratcliffe Hicks Building and Arena... C6
ROWE	John W. Rowe Center for Undergraduate Education... E5
RWF	Reclaimed Water Facility... D1
SCHN	Andre Schenker Lecture Hall... E5
SC11	Science I Research Center... E3
SPRK	South Parking Garage... F4
SRC	Student Recreation Center... F5
STRS	Augustus Storrs Hall... D5
SU	Student Union... E4
SUP	Supplemental Utility Plant... E2
TAB	Temporary Administrative Building... F4
TKS	George Safford Torrey Life Sciences Building... D4
TLG	Gordon W. Tasker Admissions Building... E3
UTEM	United Technologies Engineering Building... D4
VDM	J. Louis von der Mehden Recital Hall... F7
WARE	Central Warehouse... D2
WBA	William Benton Museum of Art... D5
WCB	Wilbur Cross Building... D5
WGC	Nathan L. Whetten Graduate Center... E5
WIDM	Carolyn Ladd Widmer Wing... D5
WITE	George C. White Building... C6
WOOD	Walter Childs Wood Hall... D5
WPCF	Water Pollution Control Facility... C1
WSH	Hilda May Williams Student Health Services... D4
YNG	Wilfred B. Young Building... C6
ZFA	Zachs Family Fine Arts Administration Bldg... F7
ATHLETICS FACILITIES - INDOOR	
AMB	Athletics Maintenance Building... H3
BFFC	Burton Family Football Complex... F4
FIF	Mark Edward Freitas Ice Forum... H4
GAMP	Harry A. Gampel Pavilion... F4
GRE	Hugh S. Greer Field House... E4
RIZZ	Rizza Performance Center... G4
STC	Mark R. Shenkman Training Center... G4
TFC	Toscano Family Ice Forum... H4
WBCC	Werth Family Basketball Champions Center... F4
WZN	Wolff-Zackin Natatorium... F4
ATHLETICS FACILITIES - OUTDOOR	
CSC	Connecticut Softball Center... G4
FPF	Football Practice Fields... F3
ELL	Elliott Ballpark... G4
JRF	Joseph J. Morrone Stadium... G4
MFC	Recreational Field Complex... H3
SFSC	George J. Sherman Family Sports Complex... E3
TC	Tennis Courts... B1
TF	Track & Field Throwing Facilities... G3
NON-UNIVERSITY BUILDINGS	
BIMP	Ballard Institute and Museum of Puppetry... F7
EOS	E. O. Smith High School... G7
FMH	Friends Meeting House... E1
GOC	Greek Orthodox Church... E8
GSH	Graduate Storrs Hotel... G6
HILL	UConn Hill... C4
HLC	Hope Lutheran Church... E8
ICUC	Islamic Center at UConn... C5
MCC	Mansfield Community Center... G7
MTH	Mansfield Town Hall... G8
PARH	Storrs Parish House... C5
SCC	Storrs Congregational Church... C5
SMC	St. Mark's Episcopal Chapel... C4
STA	St. Thomas Aquinas Chapel... C4
UCH	UConn Health Storrs... F8
RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS & COMPLEXES	
ARRH	Alumni Residence Halls... F5
Belden Hall, Brock Hall, Eddy Hall, Watson Hall	
BRH	John Buckley Residence Hall... F7
BSRH	Alan T. Busby Suites... B2
COA	Charter Oak Apartments... B2
Brown Hall, Foster Hall, Hosington Hall, Hough Hall, Hubbard Hall, Thompson Hall	
ECRH	East Campus Residence Halls... D6
EHRH	Elizabeth Hicks Residence Hall... C6
GERH	Grange East Residence Hall... C6
GSRH	Harry L. Garrigus Suites... F3
GTDH	Roger A. Gelfenbren Towers Dining Hall... C4
HAC	Hilltop Apartment Complex... G3
Beard Building, Bethune Building, Crandall Building, Community Center, Crawford Building, French Building, Grasso Building, La Flesche Building, Meritt Building, Novello Building, Stowe Building, Wheeler Building, Woodhouse Building, Wu Building	
Hilltop Residence Halls	
HRH	Elsworth Hall, Hale Hall... E3
HV	Husky Village... A4
MA	Mansfield Apartments... H8
MHRH	Marcus Holcomb Residence Hall... D6
MRH	Brien McMahon Residence Hall... F5
NCRH	North Campus Residence Halls... C3
Baldwin Hall, Fairfield Hall, Hartford Hall, Hurley Hall, Litchfield Hall, McCaughy Hall, Middlesex Hall, New Haven Hall, New London Hall, Windham Hall	
Northwood Apartments	
NWA	Northwood Apartments... E1
NWRH	Northwest Residence Halls... D3
Batterson Hall, Goodyear Hall, Hanks Hall, Northwest Dining Hall, Rogers Hall, Russell Hall, Terry Hall	
PR	Israel Putnam Relectory... F3
ROME	Lewis B. Rome Commons... F6
RSRH	Louisa J. Rosebrooks Residence Hall... F6
SCRH	South Campus Residence Halls... F6
SPRH	Lester E. Shippee Residence Hall... E7
SRH	M. Estella Sprague Residence Hall... D6
SSRH	Anna M. Snow Residence Hall... F6
Towers Residence Halls	
TRH	Allen Hall, Beecher Hall, Colt Hall, Fenwick Hall, Hamilton Hall, Jefferson Hall, Keller Hall, Kingston Hall, Lafayette Hall, Morgan Hall, Sherman Hall, Sousa Hall, Trumbull Hall, Vinton Hall, Wade Hall, Webster Hall
West Campus Residence Halls	
WCRH	West Campus Residence Halls... F5
Alsop Hall, Chandler Hall, Hollister Hall, Lancaster Hall, Shakespeare Hall, Troy Hall	
WRH	Edwina Whitney Residence Hall... D6
WRT	Peter J. Werth Residence Tower... E3
WSRH	Nellie Louise Wilson Residence Hall... F6

UCONN
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

© 2022 University of Connecticut
No part of this map may be reproduced without written permission from the University of Connecticut.

09/28/22

UConn

PHILOSOPHY

The University of Connecticut complies with all applicable federal and state laws regarding non-discrimination, equal opportunity and affirmative action, including the provision of reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities. UConn does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, genetic information, physical or mental disability, veteran status, prior conviction of a crime, workplace hazards to reproductive systems, gender identity or expression, or political beliefs in its programs and activities. Employees, students, visitors, and applicants with disabilities may request reasonable accommodations to address limitations resulting from a disability. For questions or more information, please contact the Associate Vice President, Office of Institutional Equity, 241 Glenbrook Road, Unit 4175, Storrs, CT 06269-4175; Phone: (860) 486-2943; Email: equity@uconn.edu / Website: equity.uconn.edu.

